This article assesses the effect of a reduction in secured creditor priority on distributions and administrative costs in liquidating bankruptcy cases by reporting the first empirical study of the effect of a priority change. Priority reform had redistributive effects in liquidating bankruptcy. As expected, average payments to general unsecured creditors were significantly higher after the reform than before the reform and payments to secured creditors decreased. Reform did not increase the size of the pie to be distributed in bankruptcy. Nor did it increase the direct costs of bankruptcy.
Introduction
Secured debt's role in the design of efficient priority rules is a prominent issue in law and finance. Some scholars argue that full priority for secured debt creates perverse incentives that delay liquidation of unviable firms (e.g., Webb, 1991; Hudson, 1995) and reduce secured creditors' incentives to obtain high bids in bankruptcy liquidation sales (Bebchuk and Fried, 1996; Schwartz, 1981) . But others argue that partial priority for secured debt would (1) harm business activity by reducing the credit supply (Harris and Mooney, 1997; Klee, 1997), (2) undermine freedom of contract (Bebchuk and Fried, 1997) , (3) increase the administrative costs of bankruptcy (Baird, 1997), or (4) otherwise reduce efficiency (Hill, 2002; Schwartz, 1997) .
The debate lacks empirical data about the effects of different priority rules or the effects of secured creditor incentives on insolvency proceedings (Harris and Mooney, 1997; Warren, 1997; Leeth and Scott, 1989; Barclay and Smith, Jr., 1995; Chen, Yeo and Ho, 1998; Mann, 1997a, b) . Debate in the United States also ignores experience in other countries. Nations with quite respectable post-war economic history, including Denmark and Germany, lack a security device that allows reliable secured creditor priority in inventory and receivables (1 The Right of Priority Committee, 1999:40-41) .
1 Secured credit priority reform proposals have been enacted in Finland and Sweden.
2 This article begins to fill the empirical vacuum and to provide an international perspective. It assesses the effect of Finland's reduction in priority for secured claims on distributions and administrative costs in liquidating bankruptcy cases.
Studying the effect of a reduction in partial priority is possible because bankruptcy priority rules governing an important Finnish personal property security device, the floating charge, changed in 1993. The floating charge is a non-possessory security interest in debtors' inventories, receivables, and other assets (Eisenberg and Sundgren, 1997) .
3 Before 1993, creditors holding a floating charge had priority in 100 percent of their collateral. After the change, secured creditors with a floating charge enjoy only partial priority. The new rule gives them the right to receive 60 percent 4 of the assets covered by the floating charge. We report three main results. First, the Finnish priority reform had redistributive effects in liquidating bankruptcy. Average payments to general unsecured creditors were significantly higher after the reform than before the reform. Mean payments to unsecured creditors increased from 0.9 percent of their claims to 4.0 percent and general creditors receiving nonzero payments increased more than tenfold. The average difference between distributions to floating charge-holders and general unsecured creditors decreased from 16.4 percent of the amounts owed before the reform to 7.0 percent of the amounts owed after the reform. Those hoping to shift funds from secured to unsecured creditors succeeded.
Second, we consider whether priority reform affected total payments to creditors in bankruptcy. Total payments might have increased after the reform because the reform weakened the floating charge. Floating charge-holders, who in Finland are almost always banks, might spend more to monitor debtors than before the reform. They therefore might restrict credit to troubled firms sooner, forcing firms to file for bankruptcy when more assets remain. And the less secured the banks' loans, the greater the incentive to realize the maximum value on the debtor's assets. But a comparison of total payments before and after the change in priority rules shows no significant difference. The total percent of debt repaid averaged 16.2 percent before reform and 13.7 percent after the change of the priority rules. Reform did not increase the size of the pie to be distributed in bankruptcy.
Third, Baird suggests that direct bankruptcy costs might increase if secured creditor priority is limited (Baird, 1997 (Baird, :1431 (Baird, -1435 . Reducing secured creditor priority increases both the number of claimants on a firm's assets and the complexity of the claim structure. Following Baird's suggestion, we study whether the direct costs of bankruptcy changed after priority reform but find no significant differences in the direct costs before and after reform.
This study has important limitations. Two possible effects of priority rule changes are worth separating: (1) the effects on ex ante lending and borrowing practices by creditors and debtors, and (2) the effects on distributions in insolvency proceedings. A complete analysis of a change in bankruptcy law's ex ante impact requires studying firms that do not go bankrupt (Eisenberg, 1993; Harris and Mooney, 1997) . Such an analysis is beyond the scope of the data used here (Eisenberg and Tagashira, 1994; Fisher and Martel, 1999; Sundgren, 1998; Thorburn, 2000) . 5 It nevertheless remains worthwhile to study how priority rules affect
